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1 Introduction 
General and limited partnership insolvency is governed not by the Partnership Act 
1890 or the Limited Partnerships Act 1907, which regulate other matters of 
general and limited partnership law, but by the Insolvent Partnerships Order 
1994 (IPO).1 The IPO applies to partnerships almost the full range of company 
and individual insolvency procedures set out in the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) 
- partnership voluntary arrangements (PVAs), administration, compulsory (but 
not voluntary) winding up and, for general partnerships, joint bankruptcy of all 
partners. It also provides options for partnership winding up to be accompanied 
by the winding up of corporate partners and/or the bankruptcy of individual 
partners. Unfortunately, the IPO is acknowledged by the courts2 and leading 
commentators on partnership law3 to be an exceptionally and unnecessarily 
complicated piece of legislation which is, as a result, barely usable.  
 
LLP insolvency is governed by the Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 20014 
(LLP Regulations), which supplement the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 
and apply the full range of company procedures from IA 1986 - LLP voluntary 
arrangements (LLPVAs), administration, and both voluntary and compulsory 
winding up. They also introduced a new provision into IA 1986. Section s214A 
enables the court to ‘clawback’ a contribution to the LLP’s assets from an LLP 
member in certain circumstances and has recently been examined by the court in 
Milne (Liquidator of Premier Housewares) Scotland) LLP) v Rashid5 (discussed 
below). Like the IPO, albeit to a lesser extent, the insolvency provisions of the 
LLP Regulations are unnecessarily complex and inaccessible.  
 
This article will examine the reasons for the unsatisfactory state of partnership 
and LLP insolvency laws, the nature and extent of the problem, and a range of 
possible solutions.  
 
2 Why are partnership and LLP insolvency laws in a mess? 
The extensive problems with the laws governing insolvent partnerships and LLPs 
result from their being based on IA 1986 which is designed for companies and 
individuals. Partnerships and LLPs differ significantly from companies or 
individuals, and therefore require different legislative solutions to those provided 
by IA 1986. Partners and LLP members own and manage the business,6 so their 
roles and decisionmaking differ in law from company directors or members. 
Further, partnerships – unlike companies or individuals (or indeed LLPs) - have 
no separate legal personality to their partners, and partners are personally liable 
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for the debts of the business.7 It is therefore unsurprising that the application of 
substantive company and individual insolvency legislation to them produces 
significant problems, examples of which are discussed below. 
 
These differences also mean that the theories developed to underpin company 
insolvency law do not work when transposed to partnership or even LLP 
insolvency law. For example, theories which stress that the role of insolvency law 
is to protect creditors8 fail to take account of partners’ personal liability for 
partnership debts, while theories which reflect the existence of other stakeholders 
in the business such as employees and clients9 fail to recognise that partners and 
LLP members themselves are the most significant stakeholders. Partnership and 
LLP insolvency law would more appropriately be underpinned by a multiple values 
approach such as the Cork Report’s statement of aims,10 which would allow the 
differences between them and companies or individuals to be fully reflected.  For 
example, those aims include the protection of the insolvent, creditors and other 
stakeholders; prevention of conflicts between creditors; efficient realisation and 
fair distribution of the assets; the protection of viable businesses; and - as the 
DTI11 and the Company Law Review Steering Group12 (CLRSG) also acknowledged 
in the wider corporate context - commanding universal respect and achieving a 
system that is simple and efficient. However, as will be discussed, the current 
legislation fails to fulfil these aims. 
 
Given all of this, it must be questioned why partnerships and LLPs should be 
subject to the IA 1986 regime. Partnership law has its own solutions to the 
problems which IA 1986 solves for companies, and these aspects of the IPO are 
not merely redundant but often harmful because of their ambiguities, omissions 
and overall complexity.  While LLP law provides few alternatives to the IA 1986 
regime, and therefore the insolvency provisions of the LLP Regulations cannot be 
entirely redundant, they are often harmful for similar reasons to the IPO. 
 
3 The nature and extent of the problem 
In order to demonstrate the problem, a number of key areas will be considered: 
the structure of the legislation itself, the way in which it transposes company law 
concepts, its provisions on decisionmaking, and the effectiveness of the rescue 
provisions and those facilitating the break up of a business.   
 
a) The structure of the legislation 
Although the IPO includes in full the text of modified IA 1986 provisions, it does 
not include the text of unmodified provisions. The reader must therefore 
repeatedly cross refer to IA 1986, a process made more difficult by the fact that 
the IPO fails to make it clear exactly which IA 1986 provisions apply.13 This was 
an issue in Re Newton’s Coaches,14 in which the court had to determine whether 
s216 IA 1986 applied to partnerships (and concluded that it did not). The LLP 
Regulations are even worse, because they do not set out the modified sections in 
full, but only list words or phrases inserted or deleted. Further, the separation of 
secondary partnership and LLP insolvency legislation from the primary IA 1986 
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means it is rarely made clear how, or even if, amendments to IA 1986 apply to 
partnerships and LLPs. The result is that partnership and LLP insolvency laws are 
unnecessarily complicated and inaccessible.15 It is unclear why the legislature 
chose to apply IA 1986 by statutory instrument and why, having taken this 
approach, it chose to make the secondary legislation substantially (and 
incomprehensibly) cross-referential rather than providing a fully standalone 
option. 
 
b) Transposition of company concepts 
The differences between partnerships or LLPs, and companies, are unfortunately 
not reflected in a careful adaptation of company law concepts to them, and it is 
therefore often unclear how particular concepts apply. For example, it is 
impossible to know exactly who in a partnership will be subject to the equivalent 
duties and liabilities to a director since the IPO does not define the term ‘director’ 
in the partnership context. It provides that expressions appropriate to companies 
are to be construed as references to the corresponding persons appropriate to a 
partnership,16 and so ‘directors’ must therefore include partners. However, 
although the IPO defines a member of a partnership as both a partner17 and a 
person held out as such18 (together referred to in this article as ‘partners’ in order 
to avoid confusion with LLP members),19 and it is unclear whether the term 
‘director’ also includes the latter since, by definition, they are not actually 
partners and are thus unlikely to have a management role analogous to directors.  
 
Equivalent problems result from the failure of the LLP Regulations to define 
‘members’ of an LLP;20 from the IPO’s wide definition of an ‘officer’ of a 
partnership21 which seemingly extends IA 1986 beyond partners despite the 
definition of an officer of an LLP as (only) including an LLP member;22 and from 
the treatment of partnerships as ‘unregistered companies’ for some purposes but 
not for others.23 The term ‘contributory’ is also problematic for both partnerships 
and LLPs: it is redundant in the partnership context but the IPO does not make 
this clear, and the definition in the LLP Regulations is misleading because it would 
in fact be unusual for an LLP member to satisfy the definition by entering into an 
agreement to contribute to the LLP’s assets on winding-up, or for a former 
member to satisfy it by the obligations arising from such an agreement surviving 
his departure from the LLP.24 
 
c) Internal decisionmaking procedures 
Another problem with both the IPO and the LLP Regulations is that they often fail 
to specify how decisions in an insolvency are to be taken by partners, LLP 
members, or the LLP. For example, where decisions are required to be taken by a 
specified proportion of partners/LLP members/contributories by reference to their 
value or voting rights, it is unclear how this value is to be assessed and, to the 
extent that they may include persons held out as partners, or former partners or 
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LLP members, it is unlikely that any internal agreement will confer voting rights 
on them. Equally, where decisions are to be taken by partners/LLP members/the 
LLP, it is unclear whether this requires unanimity or merely a majority. In Patley 
Wood Farm LLP v Brake and another25 the court held that since Parliament had 
provided expressly for majority action by directors in relation to administration26 
but had explicitly excluded the same provision from partnerships and LLPs,27 
unanimity was required. However, this reasoning is limited to administration, and 
in any event conflicts with the common law rule of majority decisionmaking by 
corporate bodies,28 which could apply to LLPs (which are corporate bodies29) since 
the LLP Regulations provide that the mutual rights and duties of the LLP and its 
members are determined ‘subject to the provisions of the general law’.30 Further, 
partnership and LLP law both include the default rule that ‘ordinary matters’ are 
decided by a majority but unanimity is required in order to take the more 
extraordinary decisions of admitting a new partner/LLP member or changing the 
nature of the firm’s business.31 On this basis, a decision to invoke insolvency 
proceedings would presumably be extraordinary and require unanimity,32 
whereas subsequent administrative decisions would be ordinary and therefore 
only require a majority; but no such distinction is made by the insolvency 
legislation.   
 
d) Ineffectiveness of the rescue procedures  
There are a number of problems with the way in which the company voluntary 
arrangement (CVA) procedures are applied to partnerships. For example, despite 
the fact that partners are jointly and severally liability for the debts of the 
partnership,33 a PVA only applies to partnership assets and not to partners’ 
assets. Similarly, although an administration moratorium protects the partnership 
assets, partners’ personal liability means that their private assets may still be 
subject to proceedings by creditors. In both cases the IPO could easily provide for 
linked individual or company voluntary arrangements (IVAs or CVAs) or company 
administration but does not do so. The moratorium also seemingly fails to 
prevent a dissenting partner in a partnership ‘at will’ (i.e. where the partners 
have not agreed a fixed duration) from giving notice and thereby triggering 
dissolution and potentially sabotaging the administration.34 Even more 
fundamentally, the IPO makes administration less likely to happen at all, because 
it does not allow a partnership to petition the court on the ground that the 
partnership is likely to – but has not yet - become unable to pay its debts,35 even 
though companies and LLPs may invoke this ground.  
 
e) Ineffectiveness of the break up procedures 
The problem of legislative structure is particularly acute in relation to partnership 
winding up, and the IPO provisions are virtually unusable because not only do 
they provide four separate routes to partnership winding up, but two of these 
involve concurrent petitions against the partners and import separate versions of 
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IA 1986 for the petitions against the partnership, against corporate partners, and 
against individual partners. Thus, merely identifying the relevant provisions in 
any winding up scenario is difficult. There are also many inconsistencies and 
ambiguities. For example, leave of the court is required for a petition without 
concurrent petitions if the partnership consists of less than eight partners,36 
which is arbitrary and unnecessarily restrictive.  
 
The government’s new approach to insolvency forms, which is to set out the 
required content in the Insolvency Rules rather than prescribing a statutory form 
(although templates for certain forms are provided), casts doubt on whether the 
forms set out in the IPO remain valid. Further, despite both the IPO and the LLP 
Regulations omitting certain necessary forms, the government has not set out the 
required content or templates for these forms. The Insolvency Service Guidance 
suggests that both partnerships and LLPs can be wound up in the same way as a 
company and refers to the company winding up form (Comp 1); its only 
acknowledgement that adaptions are required is the statement that applicants to 
wind up a partnership will need the to ask the court to wind it up as an 
unregistered company.37 However, use of Comp 1 would require considerable 
variations for either a partnership or an LLP and it is disappointing that it was not 
explicitly made adaptable for partnerships and LLPs, or separate templates 
provided for them.  
 
As to the two partnership bankruptcy procedures - joint bankruptcy of all 
partners, and partner bankruptcy concurrently with partnership winding up - their 
rehabilitative potential is reduced because the IPO does not apply the IA 1986 
provisions on debt relief.38  There is also an inherent tension between 
consolidating proceedings in order that the entirety of the property owned by the 
partners is administered jointly, and the different priorities for the payment of 
joint and separate debts.39 For example, the IPO’s definition of a partner’s estate 
is confused;40 and while it refers separately to the partnership’s and the partners’ 
estates,41 the unmodified IA 1986 sections which apply refer only to the debtor’s 
estate - and the debtors are the partners, not the partnership, and so it is often 
unclear which provision applies to which estate.  
 
4 Possible solutions 
 
a) Revision of the current partnership and LLP insolvency legislation 
Some of the problems with the IPO and the insolvency provisions of the LLP 
Regulations could be addressed relatively easily by amending them. For example, 
problems with the adaptation of company terminology could be solved by 
providing more comprehensive and particularised definitions for the partnership 
and LLP contexts or, in some instances, by omitting company terms from the IPO 
or LLP Regulations.  
 
However, many other problems are not so easily addressed and, in any event, 
the necessary legislative reforms are unlikely. The government proposed to 
substantially reform the IPO as long ago as 200542 but has still not done so, while 
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the LLP Regulations have been amended constantly since their inception43 yet the 
problems discussed above have not been addressed. Together with the different 
nature of partnerships and LLPs as compared to companies and individuals, and 
the consequent difficulties in applying IA 1986 to them, this means that 
alternatives to the piecemeal reform of the existing legislation must be 
considered.   
 
b) Repeal the current legislation but re-enact in standalone statutory 
provisions 
The IPO and the insolvency provisions of the LLP Regulations could be replaced 
with self-contained partnership and LLP insolvency statutes or separate codified 
chapters within IA 1986. Either would improve accessibility, reduce the likelihood 
of the legislation failing to address areas of difference between partnerships or 
LLPs as compared to companies or individuals, and make it easier to give 
partners and LLP members discretion to address as many issues as possible in 
their internal agreement.  The case for this is stronger for partnerships, which are 
not generally subject to company law and are more flexible vehicles, but it could 
also benefit LLPs.  
 
c) Repeal the current legislation without re-enacting similar 
provisions 
More radically, the IPO and the insolvency provisions of the LLP Regulations could 
be repealed, and not - or at least not wholly - re-enacted, thereby disapplying 
some or all of IA 1986.44  
 
The aims of insolvency law according to the Cork Report include preserving viable 
businesses,45 and of course rescue procedures are of considerable importance to 
partners in particular because of their personal liability.  Neither the Partnership 
Act nor the LLP legislation provides formal mechanisms to assist a firm which 
finds itself in temporary financial difficulties and so it is desirable to continue to 
apply IA 1986 rescue procedures to partnerships and LLPs.  
 
However, the application of IA 1986 break up procedures, at least to 
partnerships, is unnecessary. Consolidation of bankruptcy proceedings is 
consistent with the Cork Report aims of efficiency, and fairness between 
creditors, but IA 1986 as amended by the IPO also enables a court to consolidate 
proceedings where a bankruptcy (or winding up) petition is presented against a 
single partner,46 and this means that the problematic IPO provisions on joint or 
concurrent bankruptcy can be avoided. The application of IA 1986 winding up 
procedures is even less defensible since a partnership may be wound up under 
the Partnership Act by the partners themselves.47 Combined with partners’ 
personal liability, this can protect creditors without the need for the more 
expensive and complex intervention of insolvency law.48 Creditors would still be 
                                                        
43 Most recently by the Insolvency (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2017 (SI/1119).  
44 The IPO and the LLP Regulations also apply the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 
1986) disqualification regime to partnerships and LLPs, and substantial problems arise from this 
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them. 
45 n10 para 198.   
46 IA 1986, ss128(5A)-(5C) and 303(2A)-(2C) as inserted by IPO, Art 14; see further Official Receiver 
v Hollens n2 and Stuart J Frith, ‘Avoiding the Insolvent Partnerships Order: Part 1: Consolidating 
individual bankruptcies (1991) 4(2) Insolv Int 9-11.  
47 Partnership Act, ss38-39; for a recent example, see Campbell v Campbell [2017] EWHC 182 (Ch).  
A limited partnership’s affairs are wound up by its general partners unless the court orders otherwise 
(Partnership Act, s6(3) (or unless it is a private fund limited partnership (PFLP)).   
48 Justice, ‘Insolvency law: An agenda for reform’ (1994) para 1.16 and Milman n3 140.  
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able to use IA 1986 to bankrupt or wind up partners49 and the court could still 
consolidate proceedings,50 but the complications caused by the IPO would not 
arise. The IPO provisions on winding up should therefore be repealed.  
 
These arguments do not apply to LLPs; unless members have agreed to 
contribute to its assets on a winding up, creditors can only force them to do so if 
IA 1986 sanctions apply. Indeed, the LLP Regulations create an additional 
sanction against LLP members which is not applicable to directors and which can 
benefit creditors, the so-called ‘clawback’ under s214A IA 1986.  This enables the 
court to order a member to contribute if he 1) withdrew LLP property within two 
years before the commencement of the winding up , 2) knew or had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the LLP was at the time of the withdrawal unable to pay 
its debts within the meaning of s123 IA 1986 or would become so unable after 
that withdrawal, and 3) knew or ought to have concluded that after the 
withdrawal there was no reasonable prospect of the LLP avoiding insolvent 
liquidation. However, this test sets a very high threshold and the value of the 
sanction is accordingly diminished. For example, in Milne (Liquidator of Premier 
Housewares) Scotland) LLP) v Rashid,51 the court refused to order a contribution, 
even though it was undisputed that limb 1) was met and it held that limb 2) was 
also met, because although s123(2) deemed an LLP to be unable to pay its debts 
if its assets were less than its prospective and contingent liabilities, and this 
required not merely its liabilities to exceed its assets at a particular point in time, 
but that it could not reasonably be expected to meet its debts falling due in the 
near future.52 On this basis, the respondent member had reasonable grounds to 
believe that the LLP was unable to pay its debts.  However, the court held that 
limb 3) was not met, because there was a reasonable prospect of the LLP 
avoiding insolvent liquidation and so the respondent could not have known, nor 
be expected to have concluded, that there was no such prospect.  
 
It is therefore necessary to retain the option of LLP winding up under IA 1986, in 
order to protect creditors.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The partnership medium allows those who take on personal liability to operate 
their businesses with maximum informality and flexibility. Extensive regulation 
such as the IPO can only be justified if it is accessible and confers substantial 
benefits. The rescue procedures are therefore justified, as they have the potential 
to protect businesses as going concerns and so benefit creditors, partners or LLP 
members, and other stakeholders, although they require reform in order to 
improve their effectiveness. However, the break up procedures for partnerships 
are neither accessible nor, given that alternatives are available, substantially 
beneficial. The IPO therefore requires at least partial repeal or, preferably, 
complete repeal with re-enactment of the (reformed) rescue provisions in the 
form of a standalone statute or chapter of IA 1986. 
 
In contrast, the limited liability of LLP members justifies greater regulation, and 
necessitates creditor protection though the application of the IA 1986 winding up 
procedures although, as with the IPO, the insolvency provisions of the LLP 
Regulations require substantial reforms to improve their accessibility and should 
be reformed and re-enacted in standalone form.  
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